Process accidents are also partly caused by technical skill based on insufficient process safety information (PSI) and inappropriate non-technical skill. The causes were for example, “I didn't know it was used differently than when it was designed”, “The heat of reaction formation of the dimer was too large.” There were troubles that could be prevented at the design stage and gradually shifted from the original idea in daily operation. Engineers should make appropriate decisions by utilizing the PSI that has been accumulated by understanding everything from design to operation. Five abilities to operate PSI are defined; information collection ability, information creation ability, information sharing ability, information utilization ability and information update ability. For next use we need to update the information if it is necessary to correct the information after use. It is necessary to store information that has been updated. Wire Mesh Protection Model is modeled to explain the mechanism to prevent accidents by using PSI.The protection layers consists of two layers, technical skill (TS) and non-technical skill (NTS). If insufficient management of TS and NTS, two layers allows hazards to occur accident. Well-operated NTS leads the inner layer to prevent any accident. It is important to consider utilizing PSI to make workplace safe. Accidents can be suppressed by strengthening both layers. An operational support system based on NTS is proposed and conceptual diagram that NTS work at each event. The formal knowledge that is the subject of PSI will be complemented by unconsciousness gained from experience and the five senses and implicit knowledge that is difficult to verbalize. It will find new added value in forming PSI in Japan.
This paper shares information on developing process safety management (PSM) system for refineries and activities toward the implementation of the system for process safety enhancement.
In chemical process industry, a lot of serious accidents have been experienced like vapor cloud explosion (VCE), boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE), boil over, poisonous gas expansion and so forth. Once it occurs, workforces in the plant will be seriously injured. Furthermore, neighbors and local community will be suffered blast wave, radiant heat etc. Company revenue and reputations will be also impacted.
In our refineries, HAZOP, LOPA and management of change (MOC) have been widely applied to identify and manage process safety risks, however, it is also of great importance to identify some other risks which cannot be captured through the methods above. PSM is widely credited in the industry for reductions in major accident risk in a comprehensive and systematic way. This presentation shares our journey toward the development of PSM system and some examples of the key activities to implement the core elements of the PSM system: hazard identification and risk analysis etc.
Process safety of a chemical plant should be managed consistently throughout the plant life cycle. In order to consistently manage process safety, it is necessary to explicitly express the whole business process framework of process safety management. Therefore, we have developed a business process model as a framework. Based on the developed model, the constraints of each activity, the position of the activity can be found. Activities to assess the impact of change are heavily burdened, especially if the rationale of previous decisions is not available, particularly for change management. To reduce the burden, the rationale for any decision-making should be preserved for use in future activities. The saved rationale should be formatted for easy use in future activities. Therefore, we proposed a support system framework for smart management of change based on business process model. The system automatically generates a checklist when the rationale for decision making is proposed.
The U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB), an independent, non–regulatory federal agency that investigates the root causes of major chemical incidents, has firstly analyzed safety culture as an important element to maintain process safety in the investigation report of “BP America Refinery Explosion” in 2007. On the same year, the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) published Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS) in which process safety culture was newly added as an element.
The author found following six CSB reports which analyzed and found weaknesses of safety culture, and discussed their relations with essential features of process safety culture in RBPS.
1. BP America Refinery Explosion 2007
–Lack of reporting and learning culture
–Focus on personal safety rather than process safety
–Organizational changes and budget cuts
2. Tesoro Refinery Fatal Explosion and Fire 2014
–Management had normalized hazardous conditions
–Safety culture required proof of danger
3. Chevron Refinery Fire 2015
–Decision to operate despite hazardous leaks several times
–Reluctance to use Stop Work Authority
–Increased problems in equipment maintenance
4. Macondo Blowout and Explosion 2016
(No new findings)
5. Tesoro Martinez Sulfuric Acid Spill 2016
–Failure to learn from past incidents
–Weak management commitment to worker safety
6. Williams Olefins Plant Explosion and Fire 2016
–Deficiencies in and poor implementation of the process safety management system
Weaknesses underlined correspond to the essential features in the principle “maintain a dependable practice” in RBPS. Five reports contain weaknesses of this type, which suggests that these sites need to acquire dependable practices to develop and implement a sound culture. Repeated past incidents clearly show the normalization of deviance. Though the reports including analysis of safety culture are still limited, approaches to analyze safety culture are being accumulated.
Most of PETRONAS Operating Plant Units (OPU) are classified as a Hazardous Installation due to handling of the large inventories of flammable, explosive and toxic substances at site. The quantities of hazardous materials are estimated to be above the specified threshold values, taken from the Occupational Safety and Health Act 1994, Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards (CIMAH) Regulations, 1996.
The Safety Report demonstrate to the Department of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH) that OPU has applied strict measures to manage Major Accident Hazards as an operator of all hazardous facilities.
The Major Accident Hazard (MAH) and its mitigation through Safety Critical Element (SCE) Management Process forms a major part of the PETRONAS Risk Management Process.
This is implemented to provide a safer operating environment for people, maximizing the understanding of the risks inherently involved in the extraction of hydrocarbons, and minimizing the exposure of personnel to these risks.
Major Accident Hazards are established from a Hazard Identification Study (HAZID) as well as Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP). SCEs are identified from analysing those Hazards, and constitute the means required to manage the associated risks.
The SCE Management process has four main stages:
• Identification of Major Accident Hazards;
• Identification of Safety Critical Elements, involved in managing Major Accident Hazards
• Identification of Performance Standards, and Assurance processes that ensure the continued suitability of the Safety Critical Elements
• Verification that all stages have been undertaken; that non-conformances are being identified, controlled and closed-out; and thus that Major Accident Hazards are being controlled.
Through the diligent application of these stages, it is possible to meet the requirements for MAH and SCE Management Process giving a better way of controlling risk by PETRONAS.